Abstract-Inter-Organizational Workflows (IOWF) become important as they provide solution for data sharing, heterogeneity in resources and work coordination at global level. However, a secured computing infrastructure like Multilevel Security (MLS) is needed to support today's vast businesses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet, which is the primary medium for conducting e-commerce, is by design an open non-secure medium. Inter-Organizational Workflows allow data sharing and work coordination at the global level as the globalization of business becomes a common practice. However, the prolific use of Inter-Organizational Workflows for critical and strategic applications makes security an essential and integral part. Another major problem with Inter-Organizational Workflows is that they often use heterogeneous and distributed hardware and software systems to execute a given workflow. This gives rise to decentralized security policies and mechanisms that need to be managed.
Inter-organizational workflows merged with multilevel security provide the necessary security. However sophisticated techniques are required to review, analyze, and test this approach for correct behavior.
Workflows are case-based, i.e., every piece of work is executed for a specific case. Cases are handled by executing tasks in a specific order. Workflow process definition specifies which tasks need to be executed and in what order. Each task has pre and post conditions: the preconditions should hold before the task is executed, and the post conditions should hold after execution of the task. Most work items are executed by a resource. A resource is either a machine or a person. Resources are allowed to deal with specific work items.
Workflow has three dimensions: the case dimension, the process dimension and the resource dimension. The case dimension signifies the fact that all cases are handled individually. Cases do not directly influence each other. Clearly they influence each other indirectly via the sharing of resources and data. In the process dimension, the workflow process, i.e., the tasks and the routing along these tasks, is specified. In the resource dimension, the resources are grouped into roles and organizational units. A workflow management system (WfMS) is a software system that supports the modeling, execution, and administration of business processes. Before a workflow can be executed it has to be described in a way that WfMS is able to understand. This description is called workflow specification.
In this paper we address the following practical problem of contemporary electronic commerce: how to design correct and secure electronic commerce enterprise that involves many organizations cooperating infrequently through synchronous or asynchronous message passing. Both correctness and security are critical features of such system.
The above problem is difficult because complex communication patterns between organizations may lead to inter-organizational workflow systems that are not correct in terms of soundness and consistency. Adding requirements of MLS to such systems constitutes additional level of complexity.
IOWFs were previously analyzed and classified by several authors [15, 16, 17] . These papers provide a methodology of IOWFs modeling and analysis using Petri nets. Issues of information systems security and, in particular, of MLS were also presented in [12, 13, 14] .
In this paper we model workflows and IOWFs using Petri nets. We also apply methodologies of Petri nets and software engineering of distributed computing systems. Security features of MLS are expressed and integrated in terms of Petri nets on top of IOWFs. Such merging of IOWFs and MLS features and related analysis' techniques constitute main elements of novelty.
The paper presents a Petri net-based novel modeling technique that merges MLS features with IOWFs. It also presents an algorithm that reduces number of places in Petri net representing IOWF with MLS using the implicit places' concept.
II. MULTILEVEL SECURITY
It is a concept involving mandatory access control (MAC), i.e. the system enforces security policy regardless of the actions of system users or administrators. MLS systems [7] strive to enforce the security restrictions with incredibly high reliability so as to not leak any data at all.
Access control decisions are based on clearance level for users/subjects and classification level for information/objects in the system. The term multilevel is used because both people and information are classified into different levels of trust and sensitivity. These are referred to as security labels or security levels.
In addition to hierarchical clearance levels (e.g. Secret, Top Secret, Unclassified) information is marked by a classification level depending upon its sensitivity level. This marking (classification level) indicates another restriction placed on the distribution of a particular classified data item. A security label may include classification level identifiers in addition to a hierarchical clearance level.
A system with classification levels generally acquires a large number of distinct security levels: one for every legal combination of a hierarchical clearance level with zero or more classification levels. Fig. 1 shows a system that contains Top Secret (T), Secret (S) and Unclassified (U) hierarchical clearance levels. Information has been classified with compartments A and B. The arrows in the lattice show security levels that can be read by which other security levels [1, 2, 3] .
Two security levels can be compared based upon their clearance levels and classification levels. Given two security levels, first their clearance levels are compared. If the clearance levels are different then hierarchical ordering of clearance levels is used to determine which security level has higher precedence over the other. This is followed by comparison of their classification levels to determine the reading and writing rights. For example in Fig. 1 , if we have to compare two security labels T{A,B} and S{A} then we conclude that T{A,B} has higher precedence than S{A} based on hierarchical ordering of classification level. Then we compare classification levels of two given security labels. We conclude that T{A,B} can read data labeled S{A} since it contains the A compartment. If we have to compare security labels T{} and S{A} then we first conclude that T{} has higher precedence than S{A} based on hierarchical ordering of classification level. Then we compare classification levels of two given security labels. We conclude that T{} cannot read data labeled S{A} since it does not contain the A compartment. If clearance levels are same then the classification levels determine the higher precedence as well as the reading and writing rights.
There is also a supremum security level comprising of highest clearance level and all the classification levels. In Fig. 1 , if a user has Top Secret clearance with access to both compartments A and B, i.e. a supremum security label of T{A, B}, then he/she has the permission to read any data on the system. There is also an infimum security level formed by lowest clearance level and zero classification levels. In Fig. 1 U{} is the infimum security level. The interrelationships between these levels generally based upon reading and writing rules form a directed acyclic graph, with nodes representing the security levels. We call this graph to be a security lattice. Today's globally spread businesses use heterogeneous and distributed hardware and software systems to execute a given workflow. This gives rise to decentralized security policies and mechanisms that need to be managed. The prolific use of inter-organizational workflows for critical and strategic applications gives rise to a major concern regarding security and a need for a more reliable security mechanism.
The Bell-LaPadula Model [7, 8, 9 ] also called the multi-level model, was proposed by Bell and LaPadula in 1970s. It is a formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules. In this model, the entities in a computer system are divided into abstract sets of subjects and objects. A "subject" is somebody (user) who wants access to an "object" (information, data file, system). The concept of a secure state is defined, and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state, thereby inductively proving that the system is secure.
A system state is defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are in accordance with a specific security policy. In order to determine whether or not a specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of the object, and a determination is made as to whether the subject is authorized for the specific access mode. The Bell-LaPadula model supports mandatory access control by determining the access rights from the security levels associated with subjects and objects.
The concept of a secure state is defined by two properties: the simple security (ss) property and the *-property.
(1) ss-property allows all low-level information to be available at a higher level. It restricts high-level information to be available at a lower level. A subject is allowed to read an object only if the former's security label is identical or higher than latter's security label (no read up). (2) *-property ensures there is no write down. A subject with a higher security label should not write an object of lower security label.
These two restrictions ensure there is no flow of information from higher security label to lower security label subjects/objects. However these two properties are not sufficient to ensure that security is not compromised since it could be possible that leakage of information can occur through indirect means via covert channels.
In some situations, special devices are required to make lower security label information available at higher security label and vice-versa. We can use downgraders and starlight link [10, 11] for this purpose. Downgraders are devices that allow lower security label information to flow to higher security label but not vice versa. Starlight link is a secured mechanism that allows higher security label to write to lower security label.
Within an organization there are various subjects with hierarchical security levels ranging from high to low level. Also most organizations have various classification levels for information, depending upon its sensitivity. Bell-LaPadula security model requires identification of subjects and objects in the system and assigning security labels to them. This can be easily done because of the way organizations are composed. Thus we use BellLaPadula model to incorporate MLS in IOWF.
III. MODELING INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL WORKFLOWS
In order to explain the application of algorithms presented in coming sections of the paper, we consider an inter-organizational workflow between two organizations namely, Car Company and Tire Company. We assume that the local workflows are executed correctly. First a brief explanation of various communication scenarios that can occur between participating organizations of this inter-organizational workflow is presented. Message sequence charts are used for this purpose. A set of scenarios is a behavioral specification that can be positive or negative.
Positive Scenarios:
These are desirable behaviors. System should be able to execute every positive scenario at least once, leaving the system in a specified safe state. We have following positive scenarios for our example:
Successful ordering ( 
Resources unavailable (Fig. 3):
Car Company sends the 'tires order'. Tire Company sends 'Resources unavailable' notice. Car Company can then send the order to another company or send the order again at a later time.
Timeout (Fig. 4):
Car Company sends the 'tires order'. If the Car Company does not get an acknowledgement and 'timeout' occurs, then it resends the tires order to the Tire Company. Car Company sends the 'tires order'. Tire Company can then send 'suggest modification' message depending upon its available resources. Car Company can choose to send either 'accept or decline modification' message. 
Negative Scenarios
These indicate undesirable behaviors that the designer is aware of. System should not exhibit any of these scenarios. Following are the negative scenarios. 
Acknowledgement without order (Fig. 7):
Tire Company sends 'acknowledgement' and ships built tires to Car Company that did not order them.
Cancel order (Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 Fig. 11 shows the Tire Company workflow. This workflow is executed when resources are available and a 'tires order' is received by the owner. The owner can send an order received 'acknowledgement' or send a 'resources unavailable' notice or 'suggest modifications' message. After acknowledgement is sent order processing begins. The owner sends it to Threads maker. Thread maker starts making the thread selection. Choices of rain threads and normal threads are available. At the same time, Thread maker sends the rims requirement to Rim maker. Two choices of available rims are Rim A and Rim B. Tire maker then combines the threads and the rims to build the tires. Built tires are shipped to the Car Company by Tire shipper.
Next we use the positive and negative scenario message sequence charts to combine the workflows of participating organizations and to model the interorganizational workflow [13, 14, 15] such that all positive scenarios can occur, while negative scenarios cannot occur. This IOWF is represented in Fig. 12 . Tire order, 'resources unavailable', 'suggested modifications', 'modification response', 'tire order acknowledgement' and 'built tires' form the information exchanged between organizations.
IV. MERGING MULTILEVEL SECURITY INTO INTERORGANIZATIONAL WORKFLOWS
Now we present an algorithm to merge multilevel security into an inter-organizational workflow.
Algorithm 1 (Merging MLS into IOWF) Input: IOWF and MLS lattice Output: IOWF with MLS features
Step 1. Identify a set of subjects A = {A 1 , A 2 ... A p } where p 1 for any one of the participating workflow.
Step 2. Determine a set of hierarchical clearance levels {X 1 , X 2 ... X m } for subjects, where 1 m p and X j has higher precedence than X i for j > i.
Step 3. Identify a set of objects B = {B 1 , B 2 ... B q } where q 0 in the same participating workflow.
Step 4. Determine a set of classification levels {Y 1 , Y 2 ... Y n } for objects depending upon its sensitivity, where 0 n q.
Step 5. Combine clearance levels and classification levels to obtain security lattice with security labels S k =X i {Y 1 ,Y 2 ... Y j } where i m, j n, k m2 n , as nodes.
Step 6. Assign security labels to subjects and objects taking into account Bell-LaPadula security model and the working of the participating workflow, to form a security lattice of applicable security labels. If A is a set of all subjects and S is the set of all possible security labels, then there exists a many-to-one function f 1 : A S, i.e. each element in set A has a corresponding element in set S. If B is a set of all objects and S is the set of all possible security labels, then there exists a many-to-one function f 2 : B S, i.e. each element in set B has a corresponding element in set S. Step 7. Repeat steps 1 to 6 for all participating organizations.
Step 8. Combine security lattices of participating organization taking into account which security label can read which other security label, to obtain security lattice for the complete IOWF. If S 1 and S 2 are two security labels such that S 1 can read S 2 then introduce an arrow from S 1 to S 2 in the security lattice indicating reading right.9. Compare security label of subject with security label of object it is trying to access. Grant access only if the subject is cleared to access that object, otherwise deny access. Consider the Car Company. We first identify the subjects in the system. We have identified five subjects in the Car Company namely the owner, tire manager, car builder, tire receiver and tire assembler. We assign clearance level to each person. Then we identify the sensitive information that we need to protect. In Car Company, sensitive information comprises of car order, tire order containing tire specification, unavailable notice, suggested modifications, modification response, timeout specification, advanced car details, received tire information, and car ready notice. In all these sensitive information there are two types that need to be kept separate, namely tire information 't' and car details 'c'.
We combine clearance level and classification level to obtain security labels and assign them to subjects and objects. This assignment takes into account the company working and the Bell-LaPadula security model. For example, Tire manger would be concerned with tires and not car details and because he has Secret clearance, his security label is S{t}. This would give him access to tire order, unavailable notice, suggested modifications, modification response, and timeout specification and received tire information. Security labels obtained by following the above steps are indicated in Tab Our next step is to apply Algorithm 1 to the Tire Company. We identify subjects and objects in the company and assign security labels. Note that there are different classifications, namely threads 'th' and rims 'r' in Tire Company. The subjects, objects and their security labels are indicated in the following Table 2 . Now we incorporate these MLS features added in individual organizations into complete IOWF. For this we first form the security lattice for the complete IOWF as shown in Fig. 15 . The Tire receiver in the Car Company and the Tire shipper in the Tire Company will have access to the same built tire information (having security label U{t}) and hence they should have same security labels, i.e. U{t}. Tire manager in the Car Company having security label S{t} sends the tire order (having security label S{t}) to the owner of Tire Company having security label T{t,th,r}. This allows the owner of Tire Company to read the tires order. The owner of Tire Company should not be able to read Car details having security label S{c} and hence the owner's security label does not have the 'c' component. Similarly, taking into account what role the subjects play in the whole inter-organizational workflow, the lattice of Fig. 15 is obtained by combining security lattices shown in Fig. 13 and 14 .
We now have a representation of IOWF in PNML as shown in Fig. 12 and a security lattice indicating reading and writing rules among applicable security labels shown in Fig. 15 . To incorporate MLS features in IOWF, we need to combine both of these. As the final step of Algorithm 1, we need to verify the security label of subject with the security label of object it is trying to access. Access is granted only if the subject is cleared to access that object, otherwise access is denied. In Petri nets, a subject accesses an object during transition's firing. So we verify subject and object security labels before allowing the transition to be enabled. We implement this concept incrementally. We first apply it to individual organizations. This is shown in Fig. 16 and 18 .
Consider Car Builder trying to access Technical order with advanced details. Now we include these additional places and transitions that correspond to subject and object security label verification as shown in Fig. 16 and 18 into the inter-organizational workflow shown in Fig.  12 . Thus we incorporate the MLS features in the IOWF. The final result is shown in Fig. 19 .
V. CORRECTNESS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL

WORKFLOWS
In IOWFs each business partner has a private workflow process that is connected to the workflow processes of some of the other partners. It involves communication between the workflows of all participating organizations. Error in design of IOWF are thus difficult to detect and can result in some serious consequences. Therefore, there is need to detect the correctness of the IOWF. There are two concepts to verify the correctness of IOWF namely soundness and consistency. A workflow is sound if and only if, for any case, the process terminates properly, i.e., termination is guaranteed, there are no dangling tasks and there is no deadlock in the workflow. Consistency deals with verifying whether the implementation of IOWF meets the original specification.
In order to check the consistency [20] of IOWF, instead of checking all possible firing sequence the concept of implicit places is used to avoid state explosion. A place in a net system is a constraint on the firing of its output transitions. If the removal of a place does not change the behavior of the original net system, that place represents a redundancy in the system and can be removed. A place whose removal preserves the behavior of the system is called an implicit place, also called a redundant place [6, 13] . An implicit or redundant place always contains sufficient tokens to allow for the firing of transitions connected to it.
Behavior of a net system implies sequences of fireable transitions and marking of places in the net system. The behavior of the net system can be represented by the reachability graph.
Implicit places allow for the efficient verification of consistency. The generalized concept of implicit place set can be described as follows:
Let (PN, M) be a marked Petri net with PN = (P, T, F) and P 1 P. P 1 is an implicit place set if and only if for every reachable state M' and any transition t T: if each place in ( t \ P I ) contains a token in state M', then each place in ( t P I ) contains a token in M'. Place p P is an implicit place if and only if {p} is an implicit place set.
In Fig. 20 p 5 is implicit as it does not influence the behavior of the workflow. A token is placed in p 5 when transition t 1 fires. Then transition t 2 fires followed by t 3 . Even if p 5 was removed, it would have not affected the flow of transition firings, as can be seen from the reachability graphs. The set {p 5 } is implicit place set for the workflow in Fig. 20 . Removal of implicit place is significant especially in larger workflows. If p is not the only input place of its output transition, then p may be implicit. If a transition has only one input place then that input place cannot be implicit, because in order for the transition to fire, the input place must be present and eventually be marked. In other words, we need to analyze only those input places for which the connected transitions have more than one input place.
Hence we first need to identify transitions with more than one input place and form a set T P of such transitions. Next we form a set of input places to any transition in T P and denote it as P P. The concept of implicit place can be defined as follows... Let (PN, M) be a marked Petri net with PN= (P, T, F) with P P P and T P T such that T P is a set of transitions with more the one input place and P P is set of places corresponding to T P . If there is a path from p i excluding p i to any one of the other places corresponding to identical rows in Pre [P P , T P ] then p i is implicit. Below we present an algorithm to identify implicit places in a workflow. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has centered on developing new technique to verify correctness of loosely coupled IOWF with MLS features. The concepts of soundness and consistency were pursued for this purpose.
The first part of the paper examined various possible conceptual architectures for supporting interorganizational workflows, multilevel security and various security models to implement multilevel security features. We modeled Car and Tire Company IOWF with loosely coupled architecture using Petri nets via connecting communication elements. An algorithm was presented to add multilevel security features to this IOWF using Bell-LaPadula security model. Thus using the approach and algorithms presented in this paper companies involved in ecommerce can review, analyze and test IOWF for correct behavior. We reduced the local workflow structure, assuming they were executed correctly. The next step in this work would be to consider the effect of local workflow structure on the method to analyze for soundness and consistency. Algorithms presented in this paper can be extended with proper modifications for application to other IOWF architectures [17] . Specifications for real systems have a tendency to become large and complex. Future work will also aim at using Colored Petri nets for representation of IOWF. 
